r 



•- ADDRESS OF •• 

Ensign Will/am H. Michael 

Formerly of Company B, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, 

AND OF THE UNITED STATES NaVY 



^ ^ A 



COOPERATION BETWEEN 
GENERAL GRANT AND 
COMMODORE FOOTE . 
AND BETWEEN . . . 
GENERAL GRANT AND 
ADMIRAL PORTER . . 



<^ £^ f£ 



DELIVERED AT THE 

BIENNIAL MEETING, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FOUR, 

OF CROCKER'S IOWA BRIGADE 



By tranefer 
JUL 23 1907 




COOPERATION BETWEEN GRANT AND FOOTE AND 
GRANT AND PORTER. 



A development of this topic will disclose two 
essential facts ; first, that General Grant, at the very 
inception of hostilities between the North and the 
South, perceived the absolute need of armed vessels 
on the Mississippi and its tributaries, and his willing- 
ness at all times to accord the Navy its just share of 
credit for work accomplished ; second, that without 
the cooperation of the Navy it would have been 
impossible to put down the rebellion under any 
leadership. 

Soon after taking charge of the Western Depart- 
ment Major-General Fremont became convinced of 
the necessity of preparing a fleet of gunboats for the 
purpose of acting with the Army and of command- 
ing the Mississippi and its tributaries. The fleet, 
when it was ready for operation, consisted of twelve 
gunboats, nine of them ironclad and three wooden 
vessels. They were flat-bottomed boats and carried, 
all told, 143 guns — 64, 42, and 32 pounders. Many 
of the guns were old and worthless, and some of the 



fixed ammunition supplied the flotilla had been pre- 
pared for the Mexican war. The ironclads had been 
built hurriedly by Capt. James B. Eads, an all-round 
engineering genius, and the three wooden vessels — 
Tyler, Lexington, and Conestoga — had been con- 
structed out of towboats at Cincinnati, under the 
supervision of Capt. John Rogers, of the Navy.^^ 

In September, 1861, Captain Foote, afterwards 
Rear Admiral, took command of this fleet. He 
called the naval force a " hybrid service," which it 
certainly was. Soon after taking command he added 
thirty-eight mortar boats, which were simply flat- 
boats made of solid blocks of timber, without ma-' 
chinery of any kind, and capable of supporting one 
13-inch mortar mounted in the center. In August, 
1 86 1, when work on the construction of this fleet 
began, there was no fund out of which to meet the 
expense, no materials at hand, and no well-defined 
understanding as to just what the vessels should be, 
nor whether they should be under the War or the 
Navy Department. The new force was unlike any- 
thing hitherto known, and most of the old army 
and navy people shook their heads at the proposed 
experiment. Even the Secretary of the Navy in 
his annual report referred to it as "anomalous 
in its character, and its utility regarded by many 

*As the war progressed these were added to until the Mississippi squadron num- 
bered more than loo vessels of all types. 



with great incredulity in carrying on hostilities on 
the river, where it is believed batteries on the 
banks can easily destroy any kind of boat." This 
view of the proposed experiment was encouraged 
by the Engineer Corps, who were presumed by 
most persons then living to know all the secrets 
pertaining to effective naval warfare. The very 
general confidence in this view, however, was some- 
what shaken as the war progressed. 

To overcome petty interferences with the gun- 
boat service by subordinate army officers. Captain 
Foote was made a flag officer with the rank of 
major-general. This wise action placed him in 
position to use his own judgment for the most 
part in directing the movements of his vessels. 

Flag Officer Foote formed the acquaintance of 
General Grant at Cairo, which place became the 
base of operations for the army and flotilla late in 
the fall of 1 86 1, About this time Foote wrote to 
his wife, who was living in New Haven, Conn., and 
also to his devoted friend. Fox, Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, that General Grant was just the kind 
of man he could work with ; that the fullest under- 
standing existed between them ; that Grant was a 
man of good, practical sense, without any pomp, and 
full of earnest patriotism. At another time he wrote 
that he and Grant talked over plans of operation as 
familiarly and as frankly as could two brothers. 



THE SITUATION IN THE FALL OF 1861. 

When these two men were putting their practical 
heads together at Cairo in planning a break into the 
Confederate lines, the situation was about this : 
The Ohio River formed the northern defensive line 
of the rebellious States. Kentucky's neutrality was 
of such a nature as to give free scope to the enemy's 
operations. The Mississippi River below Colum- 
bus was entirely sealed up ; in Missouri the rebellion 
had a strong basis for attack upon the Northwestern 
States; and, in fact, the rebel line presented an 
almost unbroken front of fortified posts from the 
mouth of the Ohio to the mouth of the Potomac. 
Success in Virginia alone could avail but little to 
break this line of defense unless at the West it 
was penetrated and cut in two. Vast masses of 
Southern troops were concentrated in Tennessee 
between Nashville and the Mississippi River, and 
also in eastern Tennessee. How to come at these, 
and how to project and maintain Northern armies 
in hostile States, so far from the base of supplies, 
was a difficult question at that time, and one wholly 
incapable of solution so long as the great river com- 
munications of the West were in the power of the 
enemy. Such a solution involved the opening and 
keeping open -of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the 
Tennessee rivers; Kentucky and Tennessee must 
be held possession of with firm grasp; Columbus 



must be flanked, and the Mississippi River opened 
to its mouth. It was necessary to solve this prob- 
lem before a reasonable hope could be entertained 
that the Federal Government would be able to 
deal successfully with the rebellion at the West, or 
with the rebellion at all in its essential strength. 

VALUABLE TESTIMONIAL FROM GENERAL GRANT. 

On the return of General Grant from his trip 
around the world, it was my good fortune to be one 
of a party to meet him at Cheyenne, Wyo., and to 
ride with him several hours. In the course of a 
running conversation with the great Captain, I 
asked him what the army could have done at the 
beginning of operations from Cairo as a base with- 
out the cooperation of the gunboats. After reflect- 
ing a few seconds he answered that "it would have 
been impossible to have achieved any permanent 
success with the land force then available without 
such cooperation." He further remarked that in 
his judgment the Mississippi Valley below Colum- 
bus could not have been wrested from the enemy 
and held without the gunboats, and that the war 
could have been carried on indefinitely by the 
Confederates, 

SOME PRELIMINARY WORK ACCOMPLISHED. 

In pursuance of plans agreed upon between 
Genera] Grant and Flag Officer Foote the first 



operations of the flotilla were chiefly directed to 
explorations and reconnoissances on the Ohio, 
Cumberland, and Tennessee rivers. The boats 
were sent up and down these waters to spy out the 
positions of the enemy, and when occasion offered 
to give Confederate camps a taste of what was to 
come. 

The first "scrimmage" was at Lucas Bend, 8 
miles below Cairo, where there was an encampment 
of Confederates whom Grant desired to dislodge. 
The wooden gunboats Lexington and Cones toga 
convoyed the troops sent by Grant, and opened the 
fight. The enemy had sixteen pieces of field artil- 
lery and one rifled gun in battery. Besides these, 
two rebel gunboats came up from Columbus and 
took part in the fight. Our gunboats silenced the 
batteries on land, drove the rebel gunboats under 
cover of the fortifications at Columbus, and inflicted 
considerable damage on the cavalry which exposed 
itself at different points. 

The flotilla made excursions up the Tennessee 
and Cumberland rivers, destroying rebel camps and 
making several captures of ferryboats, etc. It thus 
felt its way to more important results. It spread 
alarm among the ranks of secessionists along the 
banks of the rivers and gave new strength to the 
enfeebled national cause, while at the same time 
it was gradually finding out its own deficiencies,. 



discovering its own powers, and securing most valu- 
able information for the Army. This preliminary 
work included the convoying of troops to Eddy- 
ville in October, 1861, where a Confederate camp 
was completely destroyed and several prisoners and 
considerable stores were captured. 

THE BATTLE OF BELMONT. 

General Grant seized Paducah and thus gained 
a footing near the mouth of the Tennessee River. 
His headquarters were at Cairo, and his army was 
rapidly increasing in numbers. November 7 he 
determined to make demonstrations against Bel- 
mont, as it was understood there would soon be a 
movement of troops from Columbus to cut off 
Colonel Oglesby, whom he had sent with 3,000 
men toward the St. Francis River. The attack was 
to be jnade at once in the hope of surprising Gen- 
eral Polk's camp at Belmont and preventing that 
officer from sending reenforcements into Missouri. 
Grant's force consisted of about 3,000 men, who 
were embarked on transports, and the Lexington 
and Conestoga convoyed them to a point 2 miles 
above Belmont, where a landing was effected early 
in the morning. The gunboats engaged the rebel 
batteries above Columbus and the troops marched 
to the attack. Grant drove the Confederates from 
their camp after a severe battle, lasting till noon. 



The enemy took refuge under the cover of the heavy 
guns on the Columbus side. Our little army held 
the field, and, instead of taking up favorable position 
under shelter of the gunboats, remained so exposed 
that heavy reenforcements from Columbus surprised 
them and nearly cut them off from the transports 
and gunboats. When this move of the enemy was 
about to be accomplished, the two gunboats took 
favorable position and with shrapnel and canister 
drove the Confederates back with great loss and 
in confusion. Our troops were reembarked and 
General Grant was the last man of his little army 
to cross the gang plank. Under cover of the 
gunboats the transports headed for Cairo. 

The importance of this little fight centers in the 
fact that it was the first pitched battle of the war in 
the Mississippi Valley proper, the first battle of the 
war in which General Grant commanded in person, 
and the first battle in which any of the gunboats 
took part. The fact should not be overlooked that 
the gunboats on this occasion not only rendered a 
service to the army and to the country in an ordi- 
nary sense, but, in view of General Grant's subse- 
quent career, in a more extraordinary sense. A care- 
ful study of this battle will justify the conclusion that 
but for the timely aid rendered by the Lexington 
and Conestoga in driving the reenforcements of 
Polk back at the moment they were crowding our 



army to the very water's edge, our troops, includ- 
ing General Grant, would have been captured 
bodily, or nearly so. The thinking mind will 
involuntarily speculate as to what effect such a 
result would have had on the future career of the 
great General who directed our armies to final 
victory. It seems to me that by this one achieve- 
ment, won at the very beginning of the war for 
the Union, the Mississippi gunboats embalmed 
themselves in glory and entitled themselves to the 
lasting gratitude of the nation. 

THE CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY. 

During one of the expeditions of the gunboats 
up the Tennessee River, Fort Henry was recon- 
noitered. As a result of these observations Foote 
suggested to General Grant the desirability of a 
combined attack on those works. The General 
had already doubtless considered the strategic advan- 
tage of getting rid of this formidable hindrance to 
the navigation of the Tennessee, and a plan was 
quickly agreed upon. 

The principal considerations which led to this 
conclusion grew out of the fact that the first strong 
line of the rebel defense at the West stretched from 
the Mississippi River at Columbus to the Cumber- 
land Mountains. It was necessary to break through 
this at the most feasible point. It could not be 



lO 

done at Columbus because of the strength of the 
fortifications and the weakness of our available 
army in point of numbers and equipment and the 
frailness of our gunboats. Nor was it deemed prac- 
ticable to attempt it by sending an army across the 
Ohio into Kentucky, so far from the base of sup- 
plies. Foote and Grant fully agreed that the most 
feasible if not the only practicable way to break 
through the line was by capturing the strongholds 
on the Tennessee and Cumberland, thus effecting 
an entrance into the Southern line and rendering 
Columbus and Bowling Green untenable to the 
enemy. In the event of success the railroad and 
telegraph communications could be cut and the 
Confederate line of defense pushed farther down, 
leaving Kentucky and Tennessee under control of 
the Union forces. 

On January 28, 1862, Foote wrote to Halleck, 
who had succeeded Fremont, as follows : 

General Grant and myself are of the opinion that Fort 
Henry, on the Tennessee River, can be carried with four 
ironclad gunboats and troops and be permanently occu- 
pied. Have we your authority to move for that purpose 
when ready? 

Two days later Halleck's order to make the move- 
ment came and three days later the movement was 
begun. 



II 

The gunboats moved cautiously up the Tennessee, 
on account of torpedoes or "floating mines," eight 
of which were fished up near Panther Island."'"' 

McClernand's division moved up the east and 
Smith's division up the west bank of the river. 
McClernand was expected to prevent the escape 
of Confederate troops from Fort Henry to Fort 
Donelson. The gunboats shelled the woods on 
both sides as they ascended, to drive off sharp- 
shooters. Everything moved off satisfactorily until 
the night of the 5th of February, when a severe 
rain storm set in, flooding the region and making 
it impracticable for the troops to move artillery. 
Every little stream was swollen to overflow, making 
it necessary to build bridges. When the hour 
arriv^ed for the combined attack the army was not 
in position as agreed upon, and the gunboats, with- 
out the support of the army, began to fire on the 
fort at 1,700 yards, and continued to work up till 
within 200 yards, all the time pouring in a delib- 
erate and heavy fire. The battle lasted one hour 
and twenty minutes, when General Tilghman 
ordered the Confederate flag lowered, and surren- 
dered his sword and the fort to Flag Officer 
Foote. The army arrived an hour after the sur- 
render and Foote turned the capture over to Grant. 

♦These were cylinders of sheet iron, sJ^ feet long, pointed at each end, each 
containing, in a canvas bag, about 7s pounds of powder. A simple apparatus was 
attached for exploding the mine by means of a percussion cap, to be operated upon 
by a lever, extending to the outside, to be set off by striking a vessel. 



12 

Generals Grant and McClernand, without con- 
sulting Foote, showed their appreciation of the 
work done by the navy under that gallant officer 
by naming the captured works Fort Foote. 

The wooden gunboats immediately after the fall 
of Fort Henry proceeded up the Tennessee under 
orders from Foote, given before the battle, in pur- 
suit of Confederate boats and to destroy the draw- 
bridge 25 miles above. The bridge was burned, a 
half-finished gunboat and several transports were 
captured and six others burned, immense stores 
taken, and the river cleared to Muscle Shoals. 

On the 14th of February the general assembly of 
Ohio passed a resolution thanking General Grant 
and Flag Officer Foote, jointly, for the victory. 

CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 

As soon as Fort Henry fell great efforts were put 
forth by the Confederates to strengthen Fort Don- 
elson on the Cumberland River, 12 miles from Fort 
Henry. Russelville and Bowling Green were vir- 
tually evacuated, and about 25,000 troops were con- 
centrated at Donelson. The fort was on the west 
bank of the river, well fortified by an irregular sur- 
face, which rose abruptly above the river 150 feet 
and contained about 100 acres. There were three 
lines of batteries commanding the river approaches. 
The lower tier was near the water, the second 50 
feet above the first, and the third 50 feet above 



^3 

the second. These batteries were armed with 32- 
pounders, lo-inch Columbiads, and one heavy rifled 
cannon, which carried a 128-pound bolt. 

The position was strongly and skillfully fortified 
on every side, and the enemy had such confidence 
in its strength that General Floyd wrote to 
Richmond : 

Have no fear about us. The place is impregnable. 
The enemy can never take it. 

The fort was invested and the ironclad Caroiidelet 
on the 13th of February opened the siege. Single 
handed she fought the water batteries all day. It 
was not a general attack, for General Grant, feeling 
the need of all available force, was awaiting the 
arrival of the other gunboats and additional troops. 
Foote was not ready, on account of the absence 
of mortar boats, which he could have in position 
within four days, yet at 3 o'clock of the 14th 
the flotilla, consisting of four ironclads and the 
three wooden boats, made a direct attack on the 
water batteries, steaming up boldly within 300 yards 
of the guns. The plan was to silence the batteries, 
run by, and enfilade the faces of the forts broad- 
sides. The fight was furious. The upper line was 
silenced, the men were flying from the lower guns, 
and the boats were just on the point of shooting by 
when the rudder chains of the foremost boat were 
cut away and the St. Louis, immediately following, 



14 

was disabled by a shot through her pilot house. A 
rifled gun burst in the third. Foote was wounded 
and the flotilla w^as forced to withdraw. The imme- 
diate object of the attack was to silence the river 
batteries and to secure a good position from which 
to enfilade the Confederate works in cooperation 
with the assault of the land forces. All this was on 
the very point of being accomplished when the 
disasters I have mentioned occurred. The failure 
was due to the weakness of the boats and the plung- 
ing shots from high batteries at short range, rather 
than any cause attributable to the way the vessels 
were fought. The demoralizing effect of the 
bombardment on the enemy was admitted by all. 

The fleet got ready to proceed to Cairo for re- 
pairs and to bring up the mortar boats to continue 
the siege. General Grant decided to await their 
return, and also the coming of reenforcements to 
his army, but sudden and unlooked-for events 
brought on a general engagement the next day. 
Early on the morning of the 15th, sorties made by 
the enemy, lead by Generals Pillow, Johnston, and 
Buckner, brought on fierce fighting and for a time 
menaced the right wing of Grant's army. At this 
moment the battle hung in the balance, wavering 
and uncertain. Grant came up in person, and, by 
a bold inspiration that snatched victory from defeat, 
ordered General McClernand to retake the hill he 



15 

had lost and ordered General Smith to make a 
simultaneous attack on the enemy's right. In- 
trenchment after intrenchment was carried, and 
when night closed the battle for the day Grant 
realized that the triumph was his. When the 
sorties were begun, Grant was in consultation with 
Foote, at the river. 

During the progress of the second day's bom- 
bardment by the gunboats, when it appeared that 
success would attend their heavy and persistent fire, 
General Pillow telegraphed to Governor Harris of 
Tennessee: 

The Federal gunboats are destroying us. For God's 
sake send us all the help you can immediately. I don't 
care for the land force of the enemy; they can't hurt us 
if you can keep those iron liellhounds in check. 

I sat at table next to General Buckner in New 
York City, at a banquet in honor of General Grant's 
birthday, and I asked him what influence the attack 
of the flotilla had on the Confederate forces in de- 
termining the evacuation and surrender. He said 
the influence was most demoralizing; that the expec- 
tation of another attack the next morning and 
the fear that the boats would get by and enfilade 
and cut off retreat had much to do in determining 
the action adopted. I asked him what the probable 
effect would have been had the boats got by the 
batteries. He said they would have been in position 



i6 

to have destroyed the Confederate army. Foote 
wrote to his wife : 

We ought to have been victorious at Donelson, as we 
fought harder than at Henry. I went into it against m}^ 
judgment by order of Halleck. Had I been given time 
to bring up my mortar boats, we could have compelled 
the surrender without so great a loss of precious lives. 

General McClellan telegraphed Foote: 

Sorry you are wounded. Your conduct was magnificent. 

A Confederate colonel who was among the cap- 
tured said that in his opinion "the army never 
could have taken the fort had it not been for the 
gunboats." At all events, there was perfect coop- 
eration between Grant and Foote. Three days 
after the battle, Foote wrote : 

Generals Grant and Smith have been to see me to-day. 
We are all friendly as brothers and I have strong faith 
and hope, under God, that we now shall have victory 
upon victory. 

On the I ith, two days before the first attack by 
the gunboats. General Halleck telegraphed Foote: 

You have gained great distinction by the capture of 
Fort Henry. Everybody recognizes your services. Make 
your name famous in history by the immediate capture 
of Fort Donelson and Clarksville. The taking of these 
places is a military necessity. Delay adds strength to 
them more than to us. Act quickly, even though only 
half ready. Troops will soon be ready to support you. 



17 

GRANT AND FOOTE READY TO PUSH ON TO 
NASHVILLE. 

The day after the capture of Fort Donelson 
Halleck telegraphed to Foote : 

Push ahead boldly and quickly. Don't delay an instant. 

Grant and Foote immediately planned to push 
on up to Nashville, and but for the interference of 
Halleck, who suddenly changed the tone of his 
telegrams to both those officers, they would have 
captured that city, with its immense military stores, 
days before it was taken. Johnston wrote that he 
"fought for Nashville at Donelson." Grant and 
Foote felt chagrined at not being permitted to 
carry into execution their plans in regard to East 
Tennessee and Nashville. The peremptory order 
of Halleck to Grant was: 

Don't let the gunboats go higher than Clarksville; even 
then they must limit their operations to the destruction 
of the bridge and return immediately to Cairo, leaving 
one boat at Fort Donelson. 

The gunboats and an army, the latter already 
embarked on transports, were ready to leave at 4 
a. m. on the 21st for Nashville, when Halleck's 
order came countermanding the proposed move- 
ment. Grant was sorely annoyed that the full 
.fruit of the victory at Donelson should not have 
been gathered. Had it not been for delays in ship- 
ping prisoners away, Grant and Foote would have 



started at once for Nashville and got there before 
Halleck's remarkable order was received. Nash- 
ville confidently expected Foote would be up imme- 
diately with his flotilla, and hence the extraordinary 
events that took place there, such as the burning 
of half-built gunboats, the burning of bridges by 
Floyd's order, and the scampering away of Pillow 
to the southward. 

Had it not been for this unfortunate check, 
Grant's future operations would have been without 
doubt by way of Nashville, and a wholly different 
and undoubtedly more advantageous turn would 
have been given to the war in the Southwest. 

Then followed the famous order* of Halleck to 
Foote and Grant, of February 25, which made the 
battle of Shiloh possible, and which directed that 
two gunboats be left in the Tennessee River to 
cooperate with Grant. 

Federal success in Tennessee had served to iso- 
late the enemy's stronghold at Columbus and to 
render it untenable; and within a few days after 

*St. Lolis, February sj, iSbs. — To Commodore Foote, Cairo: The possession of 
Nashville by General Buell renders it necessary to countermand the instructions sent 
to Foote and Sherman yesterday morning, dated 23d. Grant will send no more 
forces to Clarksville; General Smith's division will come to Fort Henry, or to a point 
higher up on the Tennessee River; transports will be collected at Paducah and above; 
all the mortar boats to be immediately brought back to Cairo; two gunboats to be 
left at Clarksville, to precede Nelson's division up the river to Nashville— having 
done this, they will return to Cairo; two gunboats to be left in the Tennessee River 
with General Grant; the latter will immediately have small garrisons detailed for 
Forts Donelson and Henry, and all other forces made ready for the field. — H. W. 
Halleck, Major-General. 



19 

the reassembling of the ironclads at Cairo this 
strong position was evacuated. The Tyler and 
Lexington went up the Tennessee to cooperate 
with General Grant, while Foote in person moved 
against Island No. lo in cooperation with Pope, 

/ THE GUNBOATS SERVE GRANT AT SHILOH. 

Opportunity for the gunboats to serve Grant and 
his army much in the same manner as at Belmont 
soon presented itself at Shiloh. It is unnecessary 
to recite here the bloody struggle of Sunday, April 
6, at Pittsburg Landing. Early in the day it was 
impossible for the gunboats to aid Grant and his 
brave men in their struggle, but later in the day 
the opportunity came. General Grant says: "At a 
late hour in the afternoon a desperate attempt was 
made to turn our left and get possession of the 
landing, transports, etc. This point was guarded 
by the gunboats, and in repulsing the enemy 
much is due to them." Unfortunately he does not 
sav how much. Those who met the terrific and 
maddened onslaught of the enemy on the left, and 
who know that they could not have maintained 
their position without the aid of the gunboats, are 
surely competent to testify. General Hurlburt, who 
commanded on the extreme left, in his report, says : 

From my own observation and the statement of prison- 
ers, the fire of the gunboats was most effectual in stopping 
the advance of the enemy on Sunday afternoon and night. 



20 

Beauregard says in his report : 

The enemy broke and sought refuge behind a com- 
manding eminence covering Pittsburg Landing, not more 
than a half mile distant, under cover of the gunboats, 
which kept up a fierce and annoying fire with shot and 
shell of the heaviest description. 

He gives as the reason for his army being unable 
to withstand the onslaught of our army the next 
day that "during the night after the first day's fight- 
ing the enemy broke the men's rest by a discharge, 
at measured intervals, of heavy shells thrown from 
the gunboats." In another part of his report he 
fefers to the Union army as "sheltered by such an 
auxiliary as their gunboats." 

The next day after the battle Lieutenant Gwin, 
commanding the division of gunboats on the Ten- 
nessee River, called upon General Grant, aboard 
of the latter's headquarters boat. The General, 
though quite lame from the injury he had received 
by the fall of his horse, walked down the steps to 
the forecastle and received the Lieutenant in person. 
They shook hands and Gwin said : "I want to con- 
gratulate you. General, on winning this great vic- 
tory." "Well," replied the General, "I am not 
sure that the army is entitled to as much credit as 
the navy." 

Li his memoirs General Grant says: 

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, 
as indeed it always did both before and subsequently, 
when I was in command. 



21 

After the battle of Shiloh, Halleck assumed com- 
mand and Grant was utterly ignored, as he says 
himself in his memoirs. When General Grant 
resumed command of the forces in Tennessee he 
immediately planned a campaign against Vicks- 
burg. This brought him again in touch with the 
Navy, and his cooperation with it continued more 
or less intimately till the close of the war. I shall 
be able, however, to refer to only a few instances 
of this cooperation, but these will illustrate how 
hearty and cordial it was. 

THE GUNBOATS AT ISLAND NO. lO, FORT PILLOW, 
AND MEMPHIS. 

A few words will bring the work of the flotilla 
under Foote and Davis down to the renewal of 
active cooperation between Grant and the gun- 
boats. The capture of Island No. lo was made 
possible by the brilliant passage of the Carondelet 
and the Pittsbtirg, under cover of darkness and 
furious thunder storms. These boats silenced the 
batteries below the island and covered the crossing 
of Pope's forces, which were enabled thereby to 
bag the Confederate army of over 7,000 men. The 
island surrendered to Foote. Then followed the 
operations and naval fight at Fort Pillow, in which 
we were successful ; the withdrawal of Pope's army 
by Halleck ; the naval battle before Memphis, which 



22 

resulted in the complete destruction of the Confed- 
erate fleet by our flotilla ; and the fight of the 
Mound City with a battery at St. Charles, on the 
White River. This completed the work of opening 
the Mississippi to Vicksburg, which was never 
again closed. 

RESUME OF ACHIEVEMENTS DURING THE YEAR. 

A fair resume of the achievements of the navy in 
the West during the year would be that a flotilla 
had been created which saved Grant and his army 
at Belmont; had, unaided, captured Fort Henry; 
had cooperated with Grant and his army in the 
capture of Donelson ; had saved Grant's left at 
Shiloh from being turned, on the first day of the 
battle, and demoralized Beauregard's army during 
the night, so that it was unfitted for service the fol- 
lowing day ; had challenged the admiration of the 
world by its dramatic passage of Island No. lo, 
which determined the fate of the island and of 
the Confederate army confronting Pope ; had de- 
stroyed the Confederate fleet at Memphis; had 
cooperated in the capture of St. Charles, which 
practically opened the Mississippi to Vicksburg, 
and thus transferred the most important operations 
from the outskirts to the very heart of the 
Confederacy. 



23 
OPERATIONS AGAINST VICKSBURG. 

The way was now prepared for General Grant's 
advance by land and water upon Vicksburg, which, 
if taken, would completely divide the Confederacy 
and cut off its largest and richest sources of supplies. 

Admiral Foote had been compelled to give up 
his command of the flotilla on account of the effects 
of the wound he had received at Donelson, and 
Davis, who had succeeded him, had been relieved 
by Admiral David D. Porter, who took command 
in October, 1862. Porter had placed the gun- 
boats in excellent repair, had added a few new ves- 
sels, and informed General Grant that he was ready 
to cooperate with him in any way possible. Grant 
had determined to make an attack on Vicksburg, 
and he made a visit to Cairo to arrange with Porter 
for the cooperation of the navy. He arrived one 
night when a supper was being given to Admiral 
Porter and his officers by Quartermaster McAllister. 
Supper had been served when Captain McAllister 
ushered in a travel-worn man, who was introduced 
immediately to Porter as General Grant. The two, 
who had never met before, repaired to a table by 
themselves, and within thirty minutes a plan of 
cooperation was agreed upon. Grant stated that 
General Joe Johnston was near Vicksburg with 
40,000 men; that he would "march directly against 
Johnston and Vicksburg; Johnston will meet me 



24 

with his army reenforced by as many men as can 
possibly be taken from Pemberton. It is my pur- 
pose to hold Johnston at Grenada while Sherman 
and the gunboats make a landing on the Yazoo. 
The weakened garrison at Yicksburg will not be 
strong enough to resist you and Sherman and the 
latter will be able to get inside of the works. When 
this shall have been accomplished, I will force John- 
ston out of Grenada and back on Vicksburg." 

It required but few moments, as I have said, for 
Grant to unfold this plan to Porter, and the latter 
informed the General that he would be able to move 
next day. Grant said that Sherman would have 
30,000 men ready to embark at Memphis by the 
time the gunboats arrived there. Without partak- 
ing of food or drink. Grant withdrew and returned 
to Holly Springs that night. This was the begin- 
ning of the campaign against Vicksburg. 

Porter informs us that he broke up the supper 
by ordering his officers to their boats, and prepara- 
tions were begun for a movement of the fleet the 
next day. The seven ironclads reached the Yazoo 
a day or so in advance of Sherman's army and had 
carried out Porter's orders in clearing the river of 
torpedoes as far up as was necessary. In doing 
this, however, the Cairo was blown up and sunk. 
The way for the landing of the troops was accom- 
plished, but owing to the unexpected strength of 



25 

the defenses and the incessant rains and depth 
of the mud it was found impossible for the army 
to gain a position that promised success, and the 
troops were withdrawn. Grant had drawn Pem- 
berton wnth a large force from the defenses about 
Vicksburg, just as he had planned to do, and the 
gunboats had cleared the Yazoo for the landing 
of Sherman's army, but what happened to Grant's 
rear and to Sherman's front made the campaign a 
failure. Of course there were some advantages 
gained, but on the whole the plan failed. 

The next move was on Arkansas Post, an iron- 
casemated fort located on the Arkansas River, 
The gunboats attacked the fort, and within three 
hours the eleven heavy guns in the works were dis- 
abled and the garrison surrendered to the navy. 
The Confederate troops, numbering about 6,000, 
surrendered to the army. 

The gunboats and the army returned to Vicks- 
burg, and soon after Grant took command in per- 
son of the entire army operating against that 
stronghold. The hearty cooperation between 
Grant and Porter in the reduction of Vicksburg is 
well known to all. Every expedient to get into 
the rear of Vicksburg by the army was made in 
conjunction with the navy; aye, not one of them 
would have been attempted without the cooperation 
of the gunboats. 



26 

The Yazoo Pass and Deer Creek expeditions, 
two of the most daring and novel experiments ever 
attempted in mihtary and naval operations, were 
jointly conducted, and the final one, which proved 
successful — that of running the batteries — was a 
perfect cooperation between the army and navy. 
The gunboats kept the communications of the 
army open ; prevented every effort to furnish reen- 
forcements to Pemberton from the trans-Mississippi 
country ; effectually shut off supplies from the same 
source ; and kept up a destructive bombardment of 
the city until the surrender. 

THE GUNBOATS HELPED SHERMAN OVER THE TEN- 
NESSEE RIVER. 

The last cooperation between Grant and the gun- 
boats in the West was in helping Sherman and his 
army over the Tennessee River on their way to join 
Grant at Chattanooga. The floods made it impos- 
sible for the army to cross and compelled it to go 
into camp at Muscle Shoals until a fall of the water. 
By the foresight of Porter, who had not been ad- 
vised officially of the march, a fleet of light-draft 
vessels was hurried up the river to meet Sherman 
and render him such aid as he might need. By this 
happy foresight on the part of Porter, Sherman 
reached Chattanooga in time to take a prominent 
part in the victory. It can not be well determined 



27 

what the result of the battle would have been had 
Sherman's army been longer delayed by the high 
water. The army and navy in the West were a 
constant help to each other. In fighting on inland 
waters each was a necessity to the other, and it may 
be said that by reason of the good sense and high 
patriotism of the men who directed the land forces 
and the naval forces in that quarter the most per- 
fect cooperation was assured. The fruit of this 
cooperation was a series of victories in quick suc- 
cession to the Federal arms, which foretold final 
triumph of the Union cause. 

COOPERATION TO THE LAST. 

Grant was made Lieutenant-General and was 
given command of the armies. He established his 
headquarters in the East and very soon began 
his great campaign against Lee. The gunboats on 
western rivers continued efficient cooperation with 
troops operating there. The Mississippi was trav- 
ersed from Cincinnati to New Orleans, and expe- 
ditions were sent against the enemy wherever he 
could be found. When Sherman began his march 
to the sea, the Navy made it absolutely impossible 
for Kirby Smith to send reenforcements against 
him, and the Navy awaited his arrival on the coast. 
When Thomas finally moved against Hood, the 
ubiquitous mosquito boat was on hand to support 



28 

him and to baffle the enemy in his effort to cross 
the Cumberland, and, but for low water in the 
Tennessee, would have intercepted his retreat till 
Thomas could have captured the bulk of his 
demoralized army. 

To complete the effectiveness of the blockade, it 
was necessary to capture Fort Fisher. The first 
step taken in this direction was the transfer of 
Admiral Porter from the West to the East. Grant 
and Porter knew each other fully, and Grant 
thought he needed his old friend and coworker 
with him. Accordingly Porter was assigned to the 
command of the North Atlantic Squadron. Soon 
after the transfer the 'joint attack on Fort Fisher 
was planned and successfully carried out ;■ the reduc- 
tion of Wilminsrton followed, which necessitated the 
evacuation of Forts Anderson and Strong. Porter 
sent vessels up as far as Fayetteville, where Sher- 
man was to pass. Every inlet was closed ; the 
Confederacy was practically sealed up ; and the 
European powers, which had sneered at our Navy 
and scouted our ability to blockade effectually 
3,000 miles of coast line, now recognized the effec- 
tiveness of the blockade — and to them this blockade 
is considered the great achievement of the war. 

Every wish of Grant was met by the Navy. 
Porter kept near him and his army on the James 
and was there ,in company with the immortal 



Lincoln when the surrender of Lee and the col- 
lapse of the Confederacy finally came. 

During the war Iowa had the distinction of fur- 
nishing the chairman of the Committee on Naval 
Affairs of the Senate in the person of Senator 
Grimes, who was the peer of any member of that 
body. The achievements of the gunboats under 
Flag Officer Foote at Belmont, Forts Henry and 
Donelson, and at Memphis aroused the great Sena- 
tor's enthusiastic appreciation and admiration. In 
a speech, remarkable for its eloquence and effect, 
delivered on the floor of the Senate, he said : 

I am anxious that the people of this entire country 
may feel that the exploits of the Navy, wherever per- 
formed, are their exploits; that its glory is their glory; 
and that while they are taxing themselves to support it 
they are supporting the right arm of the national defense. 
I desire the citizen of the most remote frontier to feel 
that he is equally protected and equally honored by the 
brave deeds of our naval officers with the citizens of the 
Atlantic coast. I wish the men of Iowa and Minnesota 
to know that they are as effectually defended in their lib- 
erties at home and in their honor abroad by the achieve- 
ments of Dupont and Goldsborough and Stringham and 
Foote on the water as thej'^ can be by any victories won 
by our armies on the land. 



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